I’ve published papers on a few topics in philosophy that don’t fall neatly under any particular umbrella, so I’m putting them here.
This one: “Seeing the Invisible: How to Perceive, Imagine, and Infer Other Minds” is about the idea that we can ‘see’ other’s mental states, and how this fits with the idea that other minds are ‘private’.
This one is co-authored with Judith Martens: “Implicit Coordination: How to Act Quasi-Jointly on Implicit Shared Intentions.” It’s about a way of understanding ascriptions of agency to social groups that doesn’t require them to explicitly coordinate: a sort of unconscious-but-still-intentional working together.
These next two are both in the genre of ‘scrutinise a popular metaphor to see how far it might be literally true, and what would it would mean if it were.’ (A genre also exemplified by this post which has become my most-found post through search engines. Internet life is unpredictable.)
These two are both in the genre of ‘notice a small and specific point that can be made about a debate other philosophers are having, and make that point without taking a stance on the larger issue involved.’
- “The Compatibility of the Structure-and-Dynamics Argument and Phenomenal Functionalism about Space”
- “Why Imagining Requires Content: A Reply to a Reply to an Objection to Radical Enactive Cognition”
I also co-edited a special issue of the journal ‘Philosophical Explorations’ with colleagues Krzysztof Dołęga and Tobias Schlicht: it’s here and here’s the introduction we co-wrote: “Enactivism, Representationalism, and Predictive Processing”
I’ve posted a couple of times at ‘Junkyard of the Mind’, a blog on the philosophy of imagination: